{"id":2938,"date":"2021-04-15T16:47:59","date_gmt":"2021-04-15T16:47:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ucf.edu\/research\/?post_type=research_project&p=2938"},"modified":"2021-04-15T16:47:59","modified_gmt":"2021-04-15T16:47:59","slug":"wifi-based-iot-devices-profiling-attack-based-on-eavesdropping-of-encrypted-wifi-traffic","status":"publish","type":"research_project","link":"https:\/\/www.ucf.edu\/research\/research-project\/wifi-based-iot-devices-profiling-attack-based-on-eavesdropping-of-encrypted-wifi-traffic\/","title":{"rendered":"WiFi-based IoT Devices Profiling Attack based on Eavesdropping of Encrypted WiFi Traffic"},"content":{"rendered":"
In this project, we investigate privacy leakage derived from an out-of-network traffic eavesdropper on the encrypted WiFi traffic of popular IoT devices. We instrumented a testbed of 12 popular IoT devices and evaluated multiple machine learning methods for fingerprinting and inferring what IoT devices exist in a WiFi network, even their working status. By only exploiting the WiFi frame header information, we have achieved 95% accuracy in identifying the devices and often their working status, with very high confidence to specific brands’ profile. This study demonstrates that information leakage and privacy attack is a real threat for WiFi network and IoT applications.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In this project, we investigate privacy leakage derived from an out-of-network traffic eavesdropper on the encrypted WiFi traffic of popular IoT devices. We instrumented a testbed of 12 popular IoT devices and evaluated multiple machine learning methods for fingerprinting and inferring what IoT devices exist in a WiFi network, even their working status. By only…","protected":false},"template":"","class_list":["post-2938","research_project","type-research_project","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\n